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Buying Votes: Examining Tufte’s 
Political Business Cycle under an 
Adaptive Expectations Framework 
 
ANNA KONRADI
A Government is not supported a hundredth part so 
such by the constant, uniform, quiet prosperity of the 
country as by those damned spurts which Pitt used 
to have just in the nick of time. 
-Brougham, 1814 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In October of 1972, twenty-five million Americans 
opened their Social Security checks to find that their 
benefit payments had increased by twenty percent. In 
the same mailing, recipients found a note informing 
them that the new statute had recently passed 
through Congress and had been signed into law by 
President Nixon. Perhaps not surprisingly, Nixon 
won his reelection bid the following month.  
  
Since Tufte’s (1978) original publication on the 
economic origins of election cycles, the public choice 
literature on the political business cycle has argued 
that self-interested incumbent politicians and their 
parties can manipulate the state of the 
macroeconomy for political gains. The literature 
supposes that a pattern emerges within a politician’s 
party’s term in office where there is “relative austerity 
in early years” followed by a “potlatch right before the 
[proceeding] election” (Norhaus, 1975). These cycles 
can be understood to exist on top of the naturally 
occurring business cycle as politicians attempt to 
artificially bolster the economy above its natural 
point right before the electorate goes to the polls. 
These positive deviations from the business cycle, if 
properly timed, have been shown to influence voter 
behavior.  
  
The relationship between the state of the economy 
and the point within the election period has been 
hypothesized most strongly for the United States 
presidency. Perhaps better than any other politician, 
the president has the unique ability to influence 
outcomes in the macroeconomy through his use of 
executive order and congressional influence.  
 
Furthermore, studies have shown that the president 
is the most likely to be praised when the economy is 
in an upturn and the most likely to bear the political 
brunt of the electoral backlash when it is 
underperforming. One can then see why an 
incumbent administration, while operating under the 
limiting economic and political constraints, might try 
and manipulate the short-run course of the national 
economy in order to improve his party’s standing in 
the upcoming elections.  
 
While voters can certainly appreciate a growing 
economy at any time during the election cycle, 
political business cycles can be problematic if they 
distort the true state of the economy from the eyes of 
the voters. When the electorate sees that its income is 
increasing and unemployment is falling, they may not 
consider the possibility that these positive shocks are 
not permanent and that these distortionary 
endeavors will inevitably lead to inflation and 
increase price levels in the long run.  
 
This paper explores the existence of electoral-
economic cycles as they apply to recent US 
presidential elections. It tests the hypothesis that the 
probability of an incumbent’s (or an incumbent’s 
party’s) reelection is significantly influenced by 
movements in macroeconomic variables which can, 
at least in the short run, be influenced by the 
executive administration. Though this paper finds 
limited evidence of consistently enacted political 
business cycles, it defines a series of motivations that 
might compel an incumbent government to 
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FIGURE 1: Transfer Payment Growth in Election Period  
 
manipulate economic variables in hopes of securing 
reelection.  
 
This article proceeds as follows: Section II reviews 
literature related to the electoral implications of 
macroeconomic variable movement under an 
uncertainty framework. Section III explores the 
theoretical model for this study and draws 
hypotheses for empirical results. Section IV discusses 
the research design and the empirical model. Section 
V reports on the results of the study. Finally, Section 
VI concludes the paper by drawing policy 
implications, acknowledging the limits of the study, 
and suggesting avenues for future research.  
 
II. Review of the Literature 
 
Arguments made for political business cycles were 
initially theoretical in nature; however, in recent 
decades, with the advent of strong Keynesianism in 
the election periods after World War II, researchers 
have sought to identify specific trends in the 
macroeconomy centered around the US presidential 
election cycle.  
 
The core argument upon which the study of political 
business cycles rests was first laid out by Edward R. 
Tufte in his seminal work Political Control of the 
Economy (1978), in which he conducts one of the first 
empirical analyses of PBCs in the United States. 
Throughout his work, Tufte made three important 
contributions to the study of PBCs. First, he 
demonstrated through historical research that 
American incumbent presidents did consider 
economic policy and the electoral calendar when 
making fiscal policy decisions. More importantly, 
however, the work revealed systematic movements in 
US transfer policies in accordance with the timing of 
elections, with the majority of the upswings occurring 
in October and November of the election years. 
Accompanying the policy movement were subsequent 
upticks in Tufte’s chief economic variable: real 
disposable income. Consider Figure 1, which details 
the quarterly change in RDI and government transfer 
payments surrounding Nixon’s 1972 reelection. 
 
Figure 1 shows the quarterly path of RDI per capita 
between 1972 and 1973, with its ever-accelerating 
climb to the fourth quarter of 1972 followed by post-
election decay. The exquisite political precision of this 
economic course is atypical of the exactness of other 
political business cycles, and must have partly been 
attributable to sheer luck. However, one cannot 
discount that much of the pre-election economic 
acceleration had to have been the result of deliberate 
planning and mobilization of policy instruments to 
produce such significant changes in government 
transfer payments.  
 
Finally, Tufte was able to show (much weaker) 
evidence of cyclical movement in other economic 
indicators such as growth, unemployment, and 
inflation. He hypothesizes that these variables are 
more difficult to control inside an administrative 
framework because they are so tied to real economic 
conditions. As a result, policy makers must be 
content to tweak them around the edges. 
 
Beyond Tufte, major works by Lewis-Beck (1988) and 
Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (2001) support the 
opportunistic model. Lewis-Beck (1988) extends 
Tufte’s model to a few of the major developed 
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Western-European powers, including Germany, Italy, 
France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The results 
essentially mirror those of Tufte: evidence is varied, 
but fairly supportive of the existence of economic 
policy cycles and of growth in nominal indicators 
(such as RDI), though the evidence is similarly 
marginal in trending economic indicators to 
countries’ electoral calendars. 
 
A more recent article authored by Nadeau and Lewis-
Beck, National Economic Voting in US Presidential 
Elections (2001), focuses on the specific indicators 
that influence the probability that an incumbent will 
be reelected, which indirectly gives politicians an 
incentive to implement certain policy instruments. 
They point out correctly that individual voters use 
information in different ways; in accounting for the 
state of the economy, some will focus more on growth 
rates while others will be more concerned with 
inflation or unemployment. That being said, 
politicians cannot simply optimize one of these 
economic indicators. It becomes necessary during an 
election cycle for the incumbent party to keep all 
economic indicators in good standing with the 
electorate. The problem is confounded then when we 
recognize that many of these variables, such as 
inflation and unemployment, are naturally negatively 
related. Democrats may choose to focus on 
unemployment rates, whereas Republicans might 
choose to run political business cycles by keeping 
inflation in check. Readers can then appreciate that 
such policy measures must be intricately woven in 
order to operate effectively.  
 
Berlemann and Markwardt (2006) extend this 
analysis to include forward looking expectations, 
explaining that voters will incorporate speculative 
expectations into their assessment of two presidential 
candidates before an election. However, they 
contend, there is a strong autocorrelative effect 
between reelection and positive economic conditions, 
helping to explain why, even in a prospective 
expectations model, incumbent politicians who 
preside over a strong economy are more likely to be 
reelected for another term.  
 
According to Filburn (2006), the basic underlying 
theory associated with political business cycles is 
simple and its basic premises have remained intact 
since Tufte (1978). The theoretical foundation of the 
PBC argument rests upon two realities and three 
necessarily stated assumptions. Taken together, the 
realities (which are generally accepted at face value) 
and the assumptions establish incentive and 
opportunity for incumbent politicians to engage in 
electioneering in the form of producing electoral 
economic cycles: 
 
Reality 1: Incumbent politicians desire reelection, 
both in terms of themselves and, to a lesser degree, 
their party. 
 
Reality 2: Incumbents control policies which can 
affect perceived or actual economic outcomes.  
 
Assumption 1: Voters favor positive economic 
activity—high growth, low inflation and 
unemployment, increasing wealth, and low taxes—
when retrospectively evaluating the performance of 
an incumbent presidential candidate. 
 
Assumption 2: Voters tend to discount past outcomes 
relative to present events in their evaluation of 
economic performance.  
 
Assumption 3: Economic performance plays a 
significant role in the voters’ decision to reward or 
punish an incumbent politician at the ballot box. 
 
All of these assumptions have been regularly 
supported throughout the literature as “economic 
voting” has become a major presumption through the 
developed, democratic world. Taken together, these 
points create a clear incentive structure for 
incumbent electioneering.  Incumbent politicians 
desire reelection (R1) and require electoral support to 
achieve that end. The support is dependent (to some 
extent) upon real economic outcomes (A3) which can 
be manipulated by those same incumbents (R2). 
Furthermore, the specific economic movements (A1) 
and timing (A2) suggest that election years should 
produce economic upswings where increased growth 
and wages, as well as lower inflation, unemployment, 
and taxes are anticipated.  
 
III. Theoretical Model 
 
One of the most common frameworks used to explain 
the existence of political business cycles is the 
macroeconomic model of aggregate supply (AS) and 
aggregate demand (AD). Traditionally this model has 
been used to relate the price level with the level of 
output, and for this purpose it suits us well. The AD 
curve relates the aggregate quantity of output 
demanded to the price level, and the AS curve relates 
the quantity of output supplied to the price level. 
 
From a political economist’s perspective, a policy 
maker’s attempt to manipulate the short run state of 
the economy has two potential outcomes: The first 
can be observed in the classical Lucas framework, 
where increased government spending is anticipated 
by the electorate, who then incorporate it into their 
own expectations. The AD curve shifts right, but there 
is an immediate response in aggregate supply, which 
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shifts left and instantaneously returns the model to 
full employment, long run equilibrium. These voters 
are not likely to be influenced by short-term 
economic boosts in the economy in the months before 
an election because they recognize the incumbent’s 
actions as self-interested and distortionary. The 
economic impact of a targeted PBC will simply be 
increased price levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
An alternative explanation which is more prevalent in 
PBC research circles involves Keynesianism’s 
assumption of adaptive expectations. In this model, 
voters can be swayed by pre-election fiscal policies, 
even if those policies will have long-term costs after 
the election. Consider Figure 3: 
 
 
 
 
In the months before the general election, the sitting 
government can try to alter the short term state of the 
economy by shocking AD to the right. This can be 
done through increased government spending, 
additional transfers to the electorate to increase real 
disposable income, or by encouraging the Federal 
Reserve to lower interest rates. Because these 
changes are unanticipated, from a Keynesian 
perspective the impact of these policies will be felt by 
individuals in the economy for a certain period of 
time. Managed well, incumbent politicians could 
conceivably alter the short run state of the economy, 
with economic indicators reaching their maximums 
close to Election Day. In terms of Figure 3, aggregate 
demand shifts from AD to AD1 and output shifts up 
to Y1. The price level also increases slightly from P1 to 
P2. 
 
However, like in the classical perspective, the benefits 
of fiscal policy cannot be felt in the long run. 
Eventually, the AS curve will shift left again, bringing 
the economy back to its long run equilibrium, but at a 
higher equilibrium price level.  
 
The cyclical nature of the political business cycle 
phenomenon can then be interpreted through the 
Keynesian lens. Figure 4 shows that the economy 
grows in the period before the election, peaking as 
time approaches the Election Day. Post election, the 
reelected government, which is now insulated for 
another four years, can constrain the economy in the 
first two years of their term in office by raising taxes, 
reducing government expenditures, and allowing for 
higher interest rates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, it is important to understand the 
relationship between the political business cycle and 
the naturally occurring business cycle. Whereas it 
might be possible to isolate the variables influencing 
electoral cycles, from a practical perspective, the 
electorate is mostly concerned with the impact fiscal 
policy has on the traditional business cycles. In 
evaluating the state of the economy before heading to 
the polls, the irrational voter superimposes the 
political business cycle on top of the naturally 
occurring cycle, and his evaluation focuses on the 
additive influence of the PBC and the amount by 
FIGURE 4: The Political Business Cycle 
FIGURE 3: AS-AD Under Irrational 
Expectations, Short Run 
 
 
FIGURE 2: AS-AD Under  
Rational Expectations 
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which it can pull and distort the real economy. 
Consider Figure 5: 
 
 
  
The solid line represents the naturally occurring 
business cycle, whereas the dashed line shows the 
perceived state of the economy when political forces 
are acting. The effect of the PBC can thus be 
understood as the deviation from the naturally 
occurring cycle. This simple model operates under 
the strong and most times unrealistic assumptions 
that the business cycle period is concurrent with the 
election cycles and these two cycles are naturally 
procyclical. In reality, the real business cycle’s period 
is independent of PBCs and the true state of the 
economy in the months before an election could be 
anything from growth to recession. In the case of a 
recession, the government would still have a strong 
incentive to operationalize a PBC as they try to 
minimize the negative impact of the economic slump.  
 
Under Keynesian assumptions for adaptive 
expectations, this research moves forward with the  
following hypotheses:  
 
1) The probability for incumbents’ 
reelection increases when economic 
performance indicator variables are 
optimized. 
2) Variables for economic growth are 
positively and directly related to 
incumbent performance at the polls. 
3) Unemployment and interest rate 
variables are negatively and directly 
related to incumbent performance at the 
polls.  
 
IV. Data and Empirical Model 
 
The macroeconomic data used in this study are 
obtained from the Economic Indicators database, 
published by the Council of Economic Advisors and 
cover the time period starting with the presidential 
election of 1948 and going through the presidential 
election in 2004 (CEA, 2008). This time period was 
chosen because all presidents during this period 
have, to some extent, incorporated a Keynesian, 
interventionist economic strategy into their 
administration. Prior to this time, most politicians 
did not believe that the government should involve 
itself in the country’s major macroeconomic affairs. 
Also, it excludes the World War II period, an unusual 
era in history when large budget deficits were run and 
many controls were placed on the economy for 
national defense reasons.  
 
The dependent variable for this study, a dichotomous 
variable for the reelection of the incumbent president 
or party was obtained from the American National 
Election Study (NES). A separate independent 
variable which looks at the relationship between 
presidential incumbency and probability of reelection 
(as opposed to party reelection) was also obtained 
from the NES.  
 
Table 1 details the individual variables, their 
definitions, and the expected coefficient signs. 
 
 
Table 1: Data Definitions 
Variable Definition Expected Sign 
Dependent 
REELECT Dichotomous variable, 1 if president or in-party is re-elected, 0 if they 
are not 
 
Explanatory 
GROWTH Average growth rate of real GDP per capita in the first three quarters of 
the election year 
+ 
UNEMPLOYMENT Percent of the labor force that is unemployed  - 
RDI Percent change in real disposable income compared to the year prior to 
the presidential election 
+ 
TRANSFERS Percent change in government transfer payments compared to the year 
prior to the presidential election 
+ 
 
PARTY Dichotomous variable, 1 if the incumbent party is running an 
incumbent candidate, 0 if they are not  
+ 
FIGURE 5: The Distortionary Effect of the 
Political Business Cycles 
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I expect the signs for the growth, real disposable 
income, and transfer payment variable to all be 
positive. Large growth or increase in per capita 
consumer welfare should increase the probability that 
individuals will view the incumbent president and/or 
party favorably. In a Keynesian model of adaptive 
expectations they should then be more willing to vote 
to re-elect the president and/or party for another 
term. Inversely, inflation is generally viewed 
negatively by voters, as it decreases their purchasing 
power in the economy. I therefore predict that high 
inflation numbers will decrease the probability that a 
president will be reelected.  
 
The expected value for the party variable relies on the 
assumption that a sitting president already has a 
large organization to help him in his campaigning 
effort. Whereas a new candidate from the sitting 
president’s party would still need to win the 
nomination against other candidates of the same 
party, an incumbent president is usually insulated 
from primary politics. He receives all of the party’s 
campaign donations, which he can save to use for the 
general election in the summer and fall prior to the 
general election in November (while non-incumbents 
have to spend large sums of money during the 
primary season to win reelection). Therefore, I 
predict that presidential incumbency will have a 
positive effect on the party’s reelection bid.  
  
The explanatory variables will be subjected to 
logistical regression to determine their significance 
predicting executive branch party reelection 
outcomes. However, because this study only uses 
post-Keynesian presidential election data, any model 
that included all of the independent variables listed in 
Table 1 above would be grossly over-specified. 
Instead, to take account of the degrees of freedom 
problem in this dataset, I will test the variables in 
pairs. However, for simplicity’s sake, the theoretical 
empirical model is delineated here below: 
 
P(reelection) = α + β1(Growth) + β2(Inflation) +  
β3(RDI) + β4(Transfers) + β5(Party) + ε 
 
V. Results and Discussion 
 
The results presented in this paper, while possibly 
clinically important for strategizing purposes given 
the small sample size, have not proven statistically 
significant.  
 
Descriptives: 
  
Running initial descriptive calculations helps to paint 
a broad image of what is going on in the data. In 
Table 2, I have presented the descriptive statistics for 
each variable used. Note that I am using data for only 
15 presidential election cycles (every election between 
1948 and 2004). The small number of individual 
election cases creates a significant degrees of freedom 
problem, and as a consequence, OLS regressions 
using multiple independent variables could not be 
run responsibly. In an attempt to partially alleviate 
this problem, data for the economic indicators were 
collected in quarterly terms, and the election 
variables were coded for their respective years. This 
meant, for example, that every quarter in 1996 was 
coded as ‘reelect’ for the dependent variable. 
 
TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Dependent   
             REELECT 0.533 0.516 
Explanatory   
            GROWTH 3.399 2.332 
            
UNEMPLOYMENT 
5.562 1.504 
            RDI 3.408 4.310 
            TRANSFERS 1.463 7.618 
            PARTY 0.533 0.516 
N=248  
  
Recall from the theory section of this paper that 
political business cycles are hypothesized to occur 
over a four year period, beginning with fiscal 
bolstering in the two years preceding the presidential 
election, followed by a downturn in the two years 
after the president is inaugurated. Tables 3 and 4 
report the descriptive statistics for both these ‘up’ 
(the two years before the national election) and 
‘down’ (the two years after the national election) 
periods. Theoretically, the GROWTH, RDI, and 
TRANSFER variables should be larger as parties and 
candidates run for reelection, while 
UNEMPLOYMENT should fall. Thus, I ran a series of 
one-tailed 2-sample t-tests to compare the values of 
the indicators around the time of the election. 
 
TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistic for ‘Up’ Years 
 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
GROWTH -8.07 13.14 3.65* 3.37 
UNEMPLOYMENT 2.83 10.37 5.51 1.57 
RDI -8.95 18.58 3.79* 4.16 
TRANSFERS -33.97 53.90 1.21 7.41 
N=126 
*indicates statistical significance at the α=0.10 level 
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TABLE 4: Descriptive Statistics for ‘Down’ 
Years 
 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
GROWTH -10.87 17.19 2.93* 4.47 
UNEMPLOYMENT 2.57 10.67 5.63 1.43 
RDI -8.29 29.89 3.01* 4.45 
TRANSFERS -31.19 71.91 1.73 7.86 
N=120 
*indicates statistical significance at the α=0.10 level 
 
The results of these comparison of means tests were 
mixed. The growth and real disposable income 
variables both prove to be significantly larger in the 
pre-election period, indicating that there may be 
some pre-election fiscal bolstering for these 
indicators. This makes sense, as previous literature 
predicts that rational individuals will vote 
retrospectively, looking at their financial situation 
when deciding whether to reelect the in-party. 
Policymakers, aware of this general trend, would 
therefore have an incentive to stimulate the economy 
as voters make their reelect or oust decisions.  
 
The unemployment variable between the ‘up’ and 
‘down’ periods did not prove to be statistically 
significant, though its inability to reach the 
significance threshold does not disprove the 
hypothesized relationship between unemployment 
and the political business cycle.  
 
It is interesting to note that the change in transfer 
payments is, on average, larger during the ‘down’ 
periods of the political business cycle. This could be 
due to the fact that much of the change that can occur 
is driven by automatic stabilizers, which are partly 
independent of the election cycle.  
 
Regressions: 
 
The OLS regression presented in Table 5 regresses 
the real GDP growth indicator (the real GDP growth 
rate between quarters from 1948-2006) against RDI, 
transfer income, unemployment, and reelection 
variables in the ‘up’ years of the hypothesized 
political business cycle. While this regression does 
not expressly look at reelection as the independent 
variable relying on economic factors, it does allow for 
additional degrees of freedom cases to be calculated 
for every quarter between 1948 and 2008.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: RGDP Regression 
 
Variables               
              CONSTANT 2.009** 
(2.001) 
Explanatory  
             GROWTH 0.872** 
(5.678) 
             UNEMPLOYMENT 0.054 
(0.321) 
             RDI 0.415*** 
(6.098) 
             TRANSFERS -0.129 
(-3.491)*** 
             PARTY -0.241 
(-0.384) 
N=126 
R2=0.357 
**indicates statistical significance at the α=0.05 level 
***indicates statistical significance at the α=0.01 level 
 
The results of this regression do not allow me to make 
any general statements about the pull of the general 
election on the national economy, although the other 
economic indicators generally have the expected 
coefficients. Note that while unemployment has a 
positive coefficient, it does not reach the significance 
threshold in this regression. The party reelection 
variable is also insignificant statistically. Thus, the 
incumbent party having a candidate does not have a 
significant effect on real GDP. 
 
The PARTY variable, which is defined in every 
quarter of an election year in which an incumbent is 
running, is also insignificant and is not an important 
determinate of real GDP.   
 
A second series of probit regressions looks at the 
relationship between probability of party reelection to 
the executive office and economic indicators. The 
data used in this model include all election year 
quarters since 1948. As mentioned above, due to a 
limited number of cases, these regressions are 
restricted to bivariate comparisons between 
variables. See Table 6 on the following page: 
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TABLE 6: Election Regressions  
These models show no clear relationship between the 
economic indicators and election years. This is perhaps 
not too surprising, however, when we take into account 
the small sample size (only 15 election cases) and the 
variety of fiscal control mechanisms that presidents 
might use to manipulate the economy. It could well be 
that the indicators observed for this paper were too 
broad to take account of specific programs.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
This study attempted to extend Tufte’s theories on 
political business cycles into the present. Unfortunately, 
significant results proved difficult to find. 
 
It is important to consider the possibility that, while 
Tufte’s theories predicted that voters were adaptive in 
their economic estimations, voters in more recent 
decades have come to adjust their expectations about 
the economy to fit with the presidential elections. When 
they see that their social security or Medicare payments 
are increasing, they may calculate that this is a short run 
adjustment in government policy designed to increase 
the vote share of the incumbent party. Realizing as 
much, voters may not be inclined to cast their ballots for 
a specific incumbent party on the basis of short term 
economic trends. In this sense, we might say that the 
American electorate has become more rational minded 
in recent decades.  
 
The other possibility that exists is that the political 
business cycle, while functional theoretically, is not 
significantly played out on the national stage. Many 
adjustments that occur on the fiscal side of the economy 
are automatic stabilizers, such as transfers, and their 
movements depend more on the state of the real 
economy than they do on politician’s election cycles.  
 
It could also be the case that the variables observed in 
this study are too broad to adequately capture the 
intricacies of government policymaking. Future research 
would thus be well served to examine more specific 
government programs that are not as subject 
to automatic fluctuations. In order to increase 
the sample size, it might also prove useful to 
look at data from many developed countries 
with electoral systems similar to that in the 
United States to determine if such systems 
have similar political business cycles.  
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-0.013 
(0.408) 
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(-0.13) 
-0.053 
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Explanatory     
RGDP -0.044 
(-1.31) 
   
UNEMPLOYMENT              -0.013 
(-0.03) 
  
TRANSFERS   -0.004 
(-0.26) 
 
RDI    0.009 
(0.32) 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.00 0.0004 0.0006 
